What Gets You Fired Up?

This spot has discussed the RNC's Voter Vault system and the DNC's comparable DataMart/Demzilla structure. These sophisticated database technologies allow campaigns to identify, track, target, and communicate with voters. Supplemented by commercially available consumer data, these systems are the engine that drives the Parties' voter identification and motivation efforts.

Bush/Cheney 2004 campaign strategist Matthew Dowd estimated that because of their focus on data collection, the campaign was able to “quadruple the number” of Republican voters who could be targeted through direct mail, telemarketing, and door-to-door visits.

Republican strategic architect Karl Rove began his political consulting career in the direct mail business, gaining a deep understanding of how targeted population segments could be motivated by narrowcast messaging.

Narrowcasting, or micro targeting as it is alternately called, was essential to the 2004 Republican strategy. In a tight election, narrowcasting provided the best opportunity to cherry-pick prospective Republicans who lived in majority Democratic neighborhoods. The most noteworthy example of the Republican narrowcasting efforts in 2004 was the RNC's contract with TargetPoint Consulting. According to the Washington Post, TargetPoint was able to

“Delve into commercial databases that pinpointed consumer buying patterns and television-watching habits to unearth such information as Coors beer and bourbon drinkers skewing Republican, brandy and cognac drinkers tilting Democratic; college football TV viewers were more Republican than those who watch professional football; viewers of Fox News were overwhelmingly committed to vote for Bush; homes with telephone caller ID tended to be Republican; people interested in gambling, fashion and theater tended to be Democratic.

Surveys of people on these consumer data lists were then used to determine "anger points" (late-term abortion, trial lawyer fees, estate taxes) that coincided with the Bush agenda for as many as 32 categories of voters, each identifiable by income, magazine subscriptions, favorite television shows and other "flags." Merging this data, in turn, enabled those running direct mail, precinct walking and phone bank programs to target each voter with a tailored message.”

Wherever possible, the Bush/Cheney campaign attempted to exploit these individual issue biases and convert them into votes on Election Day. The strategy enabled the campaign to target individuals and households in a manner never before experienced in a presidential campaign. The Republican strategy would not have been possible, however, without loads of data and effective centralized control functions.

Structurally Unsound

The Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act (BCRA) ushered in a new era and dramatically altered the landscape of the 2004 election cycle, particularly as it related to the Presidential ticket.

BCRA "banned" the soft money donations that the Democratic Party had relied so heavily upon for fundraising. Despite this, the effort to elect a Democratic candidate transitioned remarkably smoothly into this new era. The smooth transition is owed to the shadow Democratic Party, which included various 527 organizations, all of whom had specific tasks for the 2004 election. America Votes served as an umbrella organization of progressive entities determined to defeat George W. Bush. America Coming Together (ACT) was formed to focus on Get Out The Vote efforts. The Media Fund focused on broadcasting advertisements in support of the Democrat effort. The Thunder Road Group was a "rapid response organization" engaged in supporting the Democratic candidate. Finally, the Joint Victory Campaign served as a combined fundraising committee supporting the Democratic candidate.

While many other 527 organizations from across the political spectrum threw their weight behind each candidate in 2004, the efforts of the shadow Democratic party are the most important to dissect when conducting a post-mortem of the 2004 election.

It was assumed that any Democrat challenger would be at a financial disadvantage against the incumbent president. This financial gap would have to be bridged, and it was widely accepted that hard money donations to the candidate and the Democratic Party could not achieve that. That was where the shadow party stepped forward, filling the gap by virtue of 527 organizations' ability to raise unlimited amounts of soft money. As a result, many of the traditional Party functions dedicated to the election of a Democratic candidate were ceded to 527 organizations. ACT in particular served as the primary engine behind Democratic GOTV efforts in key battleground states such as Ohio.

It can be argued (and disputed) that the involvement of groups such as ACT was absolutely necessary in order for the Democratic candidate to compete on even ground with the Bush/Cheney campaign, but Democratic reliance on outside organizations to turn out the vote was a striking structural deficiency in the effort to elect John Kerry.

Because BCRA prohibited coordination between the official Kerry campaign and the DNC on one side, and ACT and the other 527s on the other, there was an inherent disconnect between the official campaign organizations and their ground operations. This disconnect was more profound when compared to the fully integrated, "centralized localization" strategy implemented by the Bush campaign that culminated in the 72 hour project.

In fact, it is a wonder (and a bit curious) that ACT and the Kerry campaign were able to function as seamlessly as they did.

Synergy is so important to electoral success. But this concept of synergy should not be restricted to merely online and offline strategies, but should encompass all efforts that serve to elect a candidate. For Kerry, true synergy was, by law, unachievable based on the structure of the Democratic campaign and its reliance on 527 organizations to GOTV.

New Tricks

I have never utilized RSS or webfeeds. I use Drudge as my information salt lick, and dig through the stacks of stories on various online news outlets when I have the time. By tomorrow, I will be loading my plate with webfeeds, and I anticipate that life may be a little easier because of it.

Amy Gahran does a great service to the uninitiated in her concise 12 part coverage of all things webfeed. Among the highlights of webfeeds are the ability to manage information overload, clean up the clutter, and provide an internet communication tool without the spam.

The applications for campaigns are striking, particular when you consider the practical drawbacks of email newsletters (such as overly restrictive spam filters and cluttered inboxes).

Webfeeds also get beyond two key quandaries associated with email newsletters. The first is frequency. Webfeeds are always there, and though information is pushed to the user, it is ultimately at the user's discretion as to when the information is viewed.

The second is relevancy. With webfeeds information can be updated continuously and thus maintains relevance. Email newsletters pose a risk of arriving with stale information. Stale information is at best a nuisance.

Webfeeds haven't exploded yet, but they will.

It's Contagious

The influentials are out there. Convince the influentials, and you're on your way toward critical mass.

They'll carry your message, supplement marketing efforts, generate buzz, and do all of this with a local and friendly flavor.

If a campaign's online success depends on the number of influentials working on its behalf, the organization must either strive to engage a high percentage of the Online Political Citizens, or allow those that aren't typically influentials to act as though they are. The best way to achieve the latter is through humor.

Nothing spreads on the internet like humor, and unlike most political discourse, its distribution travels uninhibited across ideological lines. Laughter is contagious, and humor's cascade effect on the internet is real and powerful.