What Gets You Fired Up?

This spot has discussed the RNC's Voter Vault system and the DNC's comparable DataMart/Demzilla structure. These sophisticated database technologies allow campaigns to identify, track, target, and communicate with voters. Supplemented by commercially available consumer data, these systems are the engine that drives the Parties' voter identification and motivation efforts.

Bush/Cheney 2004 campaign strategist Matthew Dowd estimated that because of their focus on data collection, the campaign was able to “quadruple the number” of Republican voters who could be targeted through direct mail, telemarketing, and door-to-door visits.

Republican strategic architect Karl Rove began his political consulting career in the direct mail business, gaining a deep understanding of how targeted population segments could be motivated by narrowcast messaging.

Narrowcasting, or micro targeting as it is alternately called, was essential to the 2004 Republican strategy. In a tight election, narrowcasting provided the best opportunity to cherry-pick prospective Republicans who lived in majority Democratic neighborhoods. The most noteworthy example of the Republican narrowcasting efforts in 2004 was the RNC's contract with TargetPoint Consulting. According to the Washington Post, TargetPoint was able to

“Delve into commercial databases that pinpointed consumer buying patterns and television-watching habits to unearth such information as Coors beer and bourbon drinkers skewing Republican, brandy and cognac drinkers tilting Democratic; college football TV viewers were more Republican than those who watch professional football; viewers of Fox News were overwhelmingly committed to vote for Bush; homes with telephone caller ID tended to be Republican; people interested in gambling, fashion and theater tended to be Democratic.

Surveys of people on these consumer data lists were then used to determine "anger points" (late-term abortion, trial lawyer fees, estate taxes) that coincided with the Bush agenda for as many as 32 categories of voters, each identifiable by income, magazine subscriptions, favorite television shows and other "flags." Merging this data, in turn, enabled those running direct mail, precinct walking and phone bank programs to target each voter with a tailored message.”

Wherever possible, the Bush/Cheney campaign attempted to exploit these individual issue biases and convert them into votes on Election Day. The strategy enabled the campaign to target individuals and households in a manner never before experienced in a presidential campaign. The Republican strategy would not have been possible, however, without loads of data and effective centralized control functions.