Follow the Money (Part II)

With the informational background on campaign finance reform efforts out of the way (see Part I), we'll move on to the dynamics that impact how Members of Congress and the Parties respond when considering pending legislation.

Campaign regulation has to be viewed through the same self-survival perspective that inevitably forms the views of the Members and the Parties who consider it, namely, how to best ensure reelection and achieve and/or retain majority Party status.

For Republicans, who were largely blindsided by the depth, preparation, and the success that Democrats had in transitioning to shadow parties in the post-BCRA world, the primary objective would seem to be creating regulatory and legal conditions that make for a more level playing field between the established parties and the 527s. While 527s on the Right are influential, it is the left-leaning 527 groups that are carrying the water for Democrats, and Republicans know this. By tightly regulating and hamstringing the ability of 527 organizations to function as they have in the past, the Republicans would put themselves at a much greater advantage in upcoming election cycles. But such tight regulation runs counter to the prevailing principles of the Republican party's historic arguments in the realm of campaign finance. So, there is a tug of war between the short-term self interest and ideological consistency.

For Democrats, ideological consistency appears to have already lost a similar tug of war. In 2001, Democratic leadership and rank-and-file members fought to pass campaign finance legislation that would ban soft money from politics. At the time, Democrats relied heavily on soft money donations to operate the DNC, so such a stand was a victory for principals. Or maybe not. Almost immediately, 527 organizations headed by figures long involved in the Washington Democratic establishment sprung up and feasted on the same soft money donations recently and self-righteously decried (and banned). Now, Democrats are being forced to consider legislation that will no longer allow them to have their cake and eat it too. Though tight regulation of 527s in the spirit of BCRA tracks the ideological path of Democrats, such regulation would hugely damage their ability to compete in upcoming campaigns. Quite a conundrum. So far, self-interest has won out, as the Democrats have voted against any regulatory modifications without providing any alternative.

BCRA has enabled the proliferation of special interest 527 groups whose objectives are semi-aligned with the objectives of the Parties. The rise of the new media coincided with BCRA to allow these interests to compete with the messaging power of major Parties and Federal Candidates. The Parties should be wary, though, as these groups are accountable only to their membership and donors. In the coming age of online citizen activism, the narrower ideological focus of these groups leaves open to question whether their influence will continue to align with the broader platform positions of the Parties.

Follow the Money (Part I)

There is a lot of activity in the 109th Congress on the subject of campaign finance reform. Frequently a hot topic inside the beltway, regulations of campaign activity impact Members of Congress very directly, so it is interesting to watch the policy positioning of both individual members and the Parties when legislative action is considered. When it comes to post-BCRA campaign regulations, it is not only the jobs of elected officials at stake, but also the risk that they will do jail time if found to be operating outside the web of regulation.

I will focus on the House here, because that has been the hotbed of recent Committee activity, but first a little background. In 2001, BCRA gained enough Republican backers to force floor action and was subsequently passed by the Congress and signed into law. The Supreme Court upheld most of BCRA, citing the opportunity for corruption or appearance thereof as justification for the limitation of free expression.

By staying within the letter of the existing law and falling outside of the Court's restrictions by virtue of their independence, 527 organizations proliferated in the 2004 election cycle. The key to the successful operation of 527 organizations is their ability to solicit and receive unlimited soft money donations.

The success of 527s has spawned two legislative approaches. The first approach, Pence-Wynn, seeks force disclosure regulations onto 527s. It would otherwise leave these organizations free to operate as they have in the past. It also seeks to level the playing field, by upping the aggregate limits for giving to political parties.

The second approach is forwarded by the original House co-sponsors of BCRA, Chris Shays and Marty Meehan, and seeks to subject the 527s to the giving limits and quarterly disclosure requirements that BCRA applies to federal candidates and political parties.

Both of these approaches have been separately passed out of Committee, and are now in line for floor consideration. They should be followed closely by political professionals for several reasons.
527s are huge business, and their existence in current form impacted all aspects of the 2004 Presidential campaign, specifically as it applied to synergy and GOTV efforts on the Democratic side.

If 527s are subjected to donation limitations, the business model changes. Born truly in the new media era, 527s have made great use of internet fundraising and messaging. Without the ability to get deep into the wallets of George Soros and Alex Spanos, the 527s will be forced to troll for smaller donations, and the internet is prime territory for such trolling.

Additionally, limiting soft money would empower smaller 527 organizations to compete with the larger 527 organizations whose lifeblood was soft money. The result would be a more diverse set of specific interests, organized as 527s, competing for donors and primacy.

Official Politics

For elected officials, there is a line between official duties and political activity. But there is one area that is greyer than others in that distinction: party activity.

Party activity is focused on political positioning, message coordination, and advancing a party's agenda by winning votes. Much of these activities can be more efficiently achieved through the web. Further still, the best means to reach the narrow target band is by establishing an intranet. The Senate Republican Conference appears to have fully embraced intranet technology and associate applications, impressing Nielsen and generating buzz through innovative incorporation of mobile technology. Deep in content and features, the Conference site is a standard bearer for online party activity in the Congress.

Intranets are tricky, though. Politically sensitive information involving legislative strategy and policy positions is not information that either party would desire to be available for public consumption, yet it is crucial for effective party activity. Intranets are thus an ideal tool to reach a limited and relatively secure and known audience. However, the taxpayers foot the bill for the official expenses of this activity. Is there an obligation for to maintain public access to all party building activities conducted at the taxpayer's expense?

Where Does the Data Go?

Campaigns are a snapshot in time. But the information that campaigns capture is highly valuable, and its value lasts well beyond the efforts of any single campaign. Modern campaigns utilize marketing and voter turnout techniques that are premised on access to loads of information. Therefore, continued access to this data is crucial if the Parties don't wish to continuously recreate efforts of the past.

The strategic importance of data continuity should be the placed above all other operational considerations faced by political parties. Data continuity feeds fundraising, maintains structures and volunteer organizations, and provides a foundation for introspective research and polling.

While the Bush campaign leveraged the RNC's data warehouse in 2004, tons of data was gathered by America Coming Together to help turn out the Democratic vote. So what happened to all of ACT's data on November 3rd? They can't simply give it to the DNC, nor can they store it in anticipation of giving it to the campaign of the 2008 contender (or any congressional candidates in the meantime). The current regulatory structure basically leaves an organization such as ACT with two options: fold up the tents and go home, or serve as a GOTV operation for democratic candidates in perpetuity.

ACT isn't going anywhere. For the Democrats, that means a continued challenge to achieve synergy among disparate and legally firewalled groups.

Ohio Thoughts

I'm an Ohio native, and made it back to the State frequently prior to 11/02/2004. My impressions of life and activities in the battleground state of the 2004 Presidential Election vary, but they add some validation to the course material.

In one of the most complex and consequential Get Out The Vote efforts in the history of electoral politics, the poor citizens of the state of Ohio drank from a fire hose of campaign activity. There were ads, and the ads were inescapable. On your radio, in your mailbox, several times during each television commercial break. And when the mail man had come and gone, and you sat in silence, the telephone calls would begin. I always wondered who these "undecideds" were that were supposed to be the difference. You could not help but decide when bombarded like that, even if it were based simply upon who bothered you less.

In Columbus, ACT was everywhere. "Volunteers", mostly plucked from campus for an attractive hourly wage, were visible at most busy street corners. I don't know who they were persuading, though. It all seemed kind of aimless, and it was mostly anti-Bush rather than having anything to do with John Kerry.

I spent the week before the election in Southeastern Ohio, straddling the Republican-leaning rural communities and the staunchly Democratic decaying industrial cities on the Ohio river. There, as part of the Bush campaign, I saw the organization of local volunteers that was marshaled and deployed in the final push ahead of the election. There was no downtime. Call lists needed completed, door knocking started at 9am, and there was always literature to be dropped. ACT was there too, but they were outnumbered. The Bush campaign focused on the appeals most likely to resonate with the culturally conservative segments of the population, highlighting in particular the 2nd Amendment, gay marriage, and abortion.

The Bush campaign in SE Ohio was in frequent contact with headquarters, providing information upstream and reassessing targets and duties based on quality feedback.

With all the rhetorical energy from the defeat-Bush camp, I was surprised to read the accounts of outright incompetence. A little aimless and disjointed was the impression that I got. With the resources poured into the state, there should not have been an opportunity for gross incompetence on either side.